Lender Liability: A Survey of Common-Law Theories by Freund, Frances E.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1989 Article 5 
4-1989 
Lender Liability: A Survey of Common-Law Theories 
Frances E. Freund 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frances E. Freund, Lender Liability: A Survey of Common-Law Theories, 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 855 
(1989) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Lender Liability: A Survey of Common-Law
Theories*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 855
II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY ............. 857
III. EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY ............... 861
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty ........................ 862
1. Control ..................................... 862
2. Special Relationships ........................ 867
B. Tortious Lender Liability ........................ 872
1. F raud ...................................... 873
2. D uress ..................................... 875
3. Interference with Advantageous Relations ...... 876
4. N egligence .................................. 878
5. Prima Facie Tort ............................ 878
C. Duty of Good Faith-Tort or Contract? ............ 879
1. Line of Credit Cases ......................... 880
2. Demand Note Cases ......................... 882
3. Tortious Breach of Good Faith ............... 883
IV. EFFECTS OF LENDER LIABILITY .......................... 885
V. JUDICIARY'S RESPONSE ................................. 887
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................... 889
I. INTRODUCTION
Lender liability litigation has increased dramatically over the past
several years. The increase in claims is hardly surprising when one con-
siders recent multimillion dollar recoveries.' Such well-publicized ver-
dicts against lenders serve to encourage borrowers to defend even
routine collection claims by striking out at the lender.
Most often borrowers bring lender liability suits following commer-
cial loan defaults. These suits are based on a number of common-law
theories for liability including: breach of contract,2 breach of fiduciary
duty,' and breach of good faith,4 as well as fraud,5 duress,6 interfer-
* Through the Special Project, this piece is cited as Special Project Note, Lender Liability.
1. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1984) ($3.6 million award
against lender); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) ($18.6
million award against lender).
2. See infra notes 18-57 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 64-134 and accompanying text.
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ence,7 and negligence.8 Some suits also raise statutory claims under the
bankruptcy laws, 9 the federal securities laws,10 the tax laws," the envi-
ronmental laws,' 2 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO).' 3
The success of many of these theories of liability has broadened the
scope of lender liability and has helped borrowers fight back against
overreaching lenders. Because many of the theories are relatively new to
the banking area, however, courts have yet to define the theories' pa-
rameters. This lack of judicial guidance leaves lenders in a difficult po-
sition. They face harsh economic consequences for failure to aid a
troubled debtor, and potential liability if they do become involved.
14
The uncertainty of the law makes it difficult for lenders to evaluate
their risks. Consequently, evaluation has become more expensive. This
evaluation expense and other increased costs eventually are passed on
to borrowers and other bank customers. Furthermore, lenders often re-
act by narrowing or curtailing important lending functions.
Parts II and III of this Note describe the most prevalent theories of
lender liability, focusing on common-law theories and highlighting
prominent cases under each theory. Conflicts among jurisdictions are
emphasized to show the need for guidelines and standardization. Part
IV analyzes the impact of increased liability on lenders, and Part V
examines the judiciary's response depicted by several recent cases. Fi-
nally, Part VI concludes that until a body of law evolves in the area of
lender liability, both lenders and borrowers will bear the costs of ex-
panded and uncertain claims against lenders.
4. See infra notes 199-257 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1982). Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the equi-
table subordination of claims. Id.
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(o), 78t(a) (1982). If a lender is found to be a controlling person, the
lender may be liable under the Securities Act of 1933, id. § 77(o), and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, id. § 78t(a).
11. See I.R.C. § 3505(a) (1982). A lender that provides a borrower with funds to be used for
payroll may be liable for failing to collect and remit withholding taxes. Id.
12. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1986). A lender may be liable if hazardous or toxic
materials are found on premises mortgaged by the lender. Id.
13. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). A lender may be liable for engaging in activities pro-
hibited by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Id.
14. Swartz, Lender Liability, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at 10.
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II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY
Lender liability is not a recent phenomenon. 15 Borrowers have been
suing banks for many years, though perhaps not as frequently or suc-
cessfully as in recent years.'" Traditionally, a borrower's claim against a
lender fell almost exclusively under the contractual rubric. Some of the
theories that plaintiffs and courts now apply to lending situations, how-
ever, are new.'
7
Contractual lender liability is not as popular among plaintiffs to-
day'8 as tort liability is because of the comparatively smaller, more lim-
ited damages available under a contract theory. Compensatory damages
do not attract as much fanfare as the multimillion dollar punitive dam-
ages available under a tort theory.19 Contractual damages are designed
to award a party the "benefit of the bargain"; 20 however, they specifi-
cally are not designed to punish the breaching party, nor to award spec-
ulative or unforeseeable damages.2' Consequently, plaintiffs today, in
15. See, e.g., Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937); Earl Park State
Bank v. Lowmon, 92 Ind. App. 25, 161 N.E. 675 (1928).
16. The following cases were listed in the August 1988 Lender Liability Law Report as
among the top ten highest lender liability judgments in 1987: FDIC v. W.R. Grace Co., 691 F.
Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ($100 million damages); Scharenberg v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., No. 87-0238-CIV-DAVIS (S.D. Fla. 1987) ($105 million compensatory damages); Pent-
house Int'l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ($129
million compensatory damages). 2 LENDER LiAmLITY LAW REPORT, Aug. 1988, at 2-3 [hereinafter
LENDER LIABmLITY REPORT].
17. For example, tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith, discussed infra notes
238-56 and accompanying text, only recently has been acknowledged as a valid cause of action in a
commercial setting. Additionally, the torts of interference, discussed infra notes 172-81 and accom-
panying text, and negligent misrepresentation, discussed infra notes 156-60 and accompanying
text, only recently have been applied to lenders. Breach of fiduciary duty, discussed infra notes 64-
134 and accompanying text, also is new to the lending context.
18. Some plaintiffs, however, contrive to base their claims against lenders solely on contrac-
tual theories. See, e.g., Verbaere v. Community Bank, 148 Ill. App. 3d 248, 498 N.E.2d 843 (1986)
(in which a mortgagor offered to deposit cash as consideration for the bank releasing a second
mortgage on his residence, and, after the cash was deposited in a noninterest bearing account and
the bank seized the money without the mortgagor's consent, the mortgagor brought a claim against
the bank for breach of contract).
19. See cases cited supra note 16.
20. Contract law was designed to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties, as well
as to ensure an efficient economic system. Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract:
When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 425,
437 & n.46 (1981). Contract damages are limited to economic losses that are foreseeable when the
contract is formed, thus reducing uncertainty and encouraging efficient allocation of resources. Id.
at 433-37. Because the cost of breach is known at formation, a breaching party can determine when
the gain from breach will exceed the cost of compensating the aggrieved party for the breach.
Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 163, 173 (1983). When the gain from the
breach exceeds the value of performance, breach becomes profitable. See Diamond, supra, at 435
n.16. This doctrine, known as "efficient breach," emphasizes economic opportunities rather than
the wrongfulness of breaching. Id. at 438.
21. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:855
hopes of recovering both the "benefit of the bargain" and a large puni-
tive award, typically bring claims under both a breach of contract claim
and various tort theories.2
A common form of the breach of contract claim is the borrower's
contention that the lender orally promised to extend a loan or other
service.23 If the promise is capable of performance within a year, the
Statute of Frauds does not require it to be in writing.24 Accordingly, a
lender's failure to execute an oral promise that is capable of perform-
ance within one year presents a valid breach of contract claim.
Lenders typically rely on the parol evidence rule when faced with a
borrower's claim of an oral agreement. The parol evidence rule provides
that the unambiguous written terms of loan documents preempt oral
agreements. 25 Thus, while the borrower may claim that a prior oral
agreement existed, the loan documents are assumed to embody the en-
tire agreement of the parties once they are signed.26 Under the parol
evidence rule, evidence of prior inconsistent terms is not admissible. 7
In contrast, evidence of subsequent oral agreements, and occasionally
subsequent conduct, is admissible to show that a written agreement has
been modified, or its terms waived.28 Courts have not responded con-
22. The larger awards recoverable under tort theories have led, in the opinion of a noted
legal scholar, to "more or less inevitable efforts of lawyers to turn every breach of contract into a
tort." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 614 (4th ed. 1971), quoted in Iron
Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Pa.
1978). Some courts have declined to apply tort claims in a lender-borrower context, despite the
recent prevalence of tort claims against banks. See Iron Mountain, 457 F. Supp. at 1158 (holding
that tort recovery was not appropriate under a claim for breach of the implied contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing when the breach involved an ordinary commercial contract); Rigby
Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to find a
tortious cause of action for breach of the good faith provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) because the U.C.C. does not provide such a remedy). Other courts have acknowledged
that tort damages are recoverable for the breach of a commercial contract only in certain circum-
stances. See Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988).
23. Cf. 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985). Borrowers also have claimed breach
of contract when the lender has reneged on a written commitment letter. Id.
24. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1987).
25. See id. § 2-202; see also Special Project Note, Written Agreements, infra, at notes 1-57
and accompanying text.
26. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1987).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Varela v. Wells Fargo Bank, 15 Cal. App. 3d 741, 93 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1971) (past
conduct of the bank waived its right to repossess without notice); Pierce v. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 142
Ga. App. 371, 235 S.E.2d 752 (1977) (creditor's acceptance of late payments waived its right to
repossess without notice).
In cases in which inconsistent conduct by the lender does not constitute waiver, a "non-
waiver" provision generally has been present in the loan agreement. See Van Bibber v. Norris, 275
Ind. 555, 562, 419 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1981) (concerning a nonwaiver provision which stated that
"[n]o waiver by the seller of any default shall be effective unless in writing, nor operate as a waiver
of any other default nor of the same default on a future occasion"); see also Delta Diversified, Inc.
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sistently to the question of modification. The following cases present
two different views on modification.
In Alaska Statebank v. Fairco2" the Alaska Supreme Court found
that the parties had modified a loan agreement by their course of deal-
ing.30 Fairco borrowed from Alaska Statebank under two loan agree-
ments. 31 Both loans were secured by the inventory and accounts
receivable of Fairco's retail store, Clowntown. 2 If Fairco defaulted on
either note, both notes would become due immediately.3 3 Fairco made
regular, although untimely, payments on the first note, but was unable
to make its payments on the second note" and, consequently, began
negotiations with the bank to extend the repayment schedule.35 During
the negotiations Fairco made a counterproposal to the bank, which
would have extended repayment. Immediately after Fairco's counter-
proposal, one of the bank officers decided to proceed against the
collateral.3
At trial the parties presented conflicting testimony about whether
the bank accepted Fairco's proposal. 7 The trial court found that the
bank, by its conduct and course of dealing, led Fairco to believe that
the payments on the note were not currently due and that no default
existed.3 8 The court also found that Fairco's reliance on that belief was
reasonable .3 The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's hold-
ing that the loan agreement had been modified and that Fairco was not
in default when the bank repossessed the collateral. 0
On similar facts a Florida appellate court in Flagship National
Bank v. Gray Distribution Systems, Inc. 1 reached an opposite result.
In Flagship the borrower, Gray, borrowed three hundred seventy-five
v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 171 Ga. App. 625, 320 S.E.2d 767 (1984) (holding that a waiver provi-
sion signed by the guarantors precluded them from asserting inconsistent bank conduct as a de-
fense to the bank's action to recover amounts under a loan default).
29. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
30. Id. at 293.
31. Id. at 289.
32. Id. at nn.1 & 2.
33. Id. at 289.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 290.
36. Id.
37. Id. The trial judge accepted Fairco's version of the testimony, which tended to show that
an agreement had been reached to extend repayment. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The trial court also noted that even if a default did exist, the bank was required to
give notice before proceeding against the collateral. Id. at 292.
40. Id. at 292-93. The Alaska Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court, noted that "modi-
fication of a written contract may be effected either through subsequent conduct or oral agree-
ments." Id. at 292.
41. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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thousand dollars from Flagship and pledged its accounts receivable as
security. 42 When the business began to deteriorate, Gray could not
make its payments and Flagship declared the loan in default.43 After
demanding payment, which Gray could not make, Flagship restructured
the loan under a "workout" agreement" by executing a new note in-
creasing Gray's indebtedness to four hundred thousand dollars. This
new loan agreement provided that the principal and unpaid interest
would be payable on demand.45 Despite the four hundred thousand dol-
lar lending limit, Flagship extended approximately two hundred thou-
sand dollars in excess of this limit.46 When business continued to
decline despite these efforts, Flagship gave Gray written notice of de-
fault and demanded payment in full. 47 Flagship then instituted an ac-
tion to recover amounts Gray owed under the loan. In response, Gray
asserted breach of contract as an affirmative defense and counter-
claim.48 The trial court found that Flagship's extension of credit beyond
the lending limitation in the original agreement modified the agreement
and bound Flagship to continue to extend credit beyond the limit.49 Ac-
cordingly, the trial court held that Flagship's demand for payment
breached the modified loan agreement."'
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision because it
found no modification or breach of the original agreement.51 While the
court agreed that a written contract may be modified by a course of
dealing, it determined that when a course of dealing and the express
terms of a contract conflict, the express terms control.52 The court
found that the express terms of Gray's loan providing for a credit limit
of four hundred thousand dollars and payment on demand overrode
any modifications that might have been inferred from the parties'
42. Id. at 1338.
43. Id.
44. Id. A "workout" agreement is an out of court financial arrangement that restructures the
debtor's business. See generally Business Loan Workouts 1983, 309 P.L.I. CoM. L. & PRAC. SEP.
(1983); see also Rosenberg, An Overview of Workouts From the Perspective of the Institutional
Lender, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1984).
45. Flagship, 485 So. 2d at 1338.
46. Id. at 1338-39.
47. Id. at 1339.
48. Id. Flagship and Gray reached a settlement agreement regarding Flagship's right to pos-
sess Gray's collateral. The action proceeded to recover the amount of the loan not satisfied by
liquidation of the collateral. Flagship obtained a partial summary judgment awarding it a defi-
ciency judgment of $234,198.52. It was at this point that Gray was granted permission to file defen-
sive pleadings. Id.
49. Id. at 1340.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1340-41.
52. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1987).
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course of dealings.53
Although the loan agreement in Alaska Statebank also contained
express terms that were not followed strictly, the court found that nego-
tiations to "workout" the loan had modified the agreement.5 Lack of
notice in Alaska Statebank55 could distinguish that case from Flagship;
however, the appellate court's finding of no modification in Flagship
was based on its determination that express terms controlled course of
dealing, rather than on the fact that the bank gave notice before insti-
tuting an action to repossess the collateral.56 In addition, lack of notice
was the basis for the Alaska Statebank court's finding of wrongful re-
possession, but it was not a factor in the determination that the loan
agreement had been modified.57 Thus, the fact that notice was present
in Flagship and absent in Alaska Statebank does not account for the
inconsistency of the decisions on the issue of modification. The uncer-
tainty under this traditional theory of lender liability, however, pales in
comparison to the confusion created by the emerging theories of lender
liability.
III. EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY
Most of the various tort and fiduciary principles wielded against
lenders today as "new" theories of lender liability existed for centuries
before plaintiffs began to apply them in a commercial setting. Even
during the twentieth century, lenders were not the first to experience
the impact of the substantial jury awards available under these theo-
ries. Insurance companies, doctors, accountants, and other professionals
have all been subjected to the growing trend of the "business tort. '58
While tort and fiduciary liabilities are not entirely new to lenders,59
the frequency of their application has increased dramatically in the
53. Flagship, 485 So. 2d at 1340-41.
54. Alaska Statebank, 674 P.2d at 289, 292-93.
55. Id. at 292.
56. See Flagship, 485 So. 2d at 1340. A Wisconsin appellate court also found that a course of
dealing by a bank (it used the synonymous phrase "course of performance") would not modify the
bank's obligation with respect to overdrafts. Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 131 Wis. 2d 389, 388
N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1986). The court in that case based its decision on grounds different than
those used in either Flagship or Alaska Statebank. The Schaller court found that modification by
course of dealing applied only to ongoing sales contracts and was not applicable to banking rela-
tionships. Id. at 400, 388 N.W.2d at 650.
57. See Alaska Statebank, 674 P.2d at 292-93.
58. See Does Lender Liability Now Include Banker Malpractice?, U.S. BANKER, May 1986, at
26; see also Coffey, The Expansion of Lender Liability in Florida, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 85, 124
(1988); Note, The Doctrine of Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 200 (1988). For a discussion
of medical liability, see Special Project Note, Arbitration, infra, at notes 153-93 and accompanying
text.
59. See, e.g., Earl Park State Bank v. Lowmon, 92 Ind. App. 25, 161 N.E. 675 (1928).
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past few years. It has become common practice to advance at least one
tort or fiduciary claim in any suit brought by or against a lender, re-
gardless of the circumstances of the primary complaint.6 0
In order to recover successfully under a tort theory, a party must
establish a duty of care owed by the lender to the borrower. Addition-
ally, the borrower must show that the lender's breach of this duty prox-
imately caused his injuries. 1 A lender also may be held liable to the
borrower or other creditors for breaching its fiduciary duties.
A fiduciary duty may be established in several ways. Two of the
more common ways to prove that a lender owed a fiduciary duty to a
borrower are the control and special relationship 2 theories. If a fiduci-
ary duty is established through either lender control of the borrower or
a special advisory relationship with the borrower, a lender may be liable
for abusing this fiduciary duty to the borrower. Lenders also may be
subject to liability for breach of the duty of good faith. This section
will discuss lender liability based on breach of fiduciary duty, tortious
lender liability, and lender liability for breach of the duty of good faith.
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
1. Control
Lenders often become involved, to some degree, in the management
and operations of a troubled borrower. This type of control, even if ex-
pressly allowed by the loan agreement, can place the lender in a fiduci-
ary relationship with the borrower. 4 Once the lender achieves fiduciary
status, it may be liable under theories such as agency, instrumentality,
60. See, e.g., Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679
(1985) (claiming breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
fraud, disparagement of credit, interference with prospective economic advantage, promissory es-
toppel, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank
& Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (claiming fraud, breach of duty of good faith,
and prima facie tort).
61. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 30, at 143.
62. See infra notes 104-34 and accompanying text.
63. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987) (creating a contractual duty of good faith). The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts also imposes a contractual duty of good faith in § 205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTs]. Some courts recognize tor-
tious liability for breaching the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See infra notes
227-57 and accompanying text.
64. The lender also may be found to owe a fiduciary duty to the borrower's other creditors.
See, e.g., In re Beverages Int'l, Ltd., 50 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (holding that the credi-
tor's security interest was void, and that the creditor's claim was subordinated because the creditor
breached a fiduciary duty owed as a result of control and decision-making authority over the
debtor); Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re American Lumber Co.), 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1980) (stating that a lender's claim was subordinated because the lender used its power as a
controlling creditor in a manner which injured other creditors).
862 [Vol. 42:855
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and alter ego.e 5
Under the common-law theory of agency, lender liability is based
upon the determination that a controlling lender has become a princi-
pal and the debtor has become its agent. As a principal, the lender must
treat the debtor and other creditors fairly and impartially in matters
related to the debtor."6 The following case illustrates the application of
agency principles in a debtor-creditor relationship.
In A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.67 the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that the financial and managerial control exercised
by a creditor established an agency relationship between the debtor and
creditor. The Jenson court defined agency as "the manifestation of con-
sent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."'68 The court
required that an agreement exist between the parties before an agency
relationship could be found. 9 An explicit contract between the parties
was not necessary, however, because the agreement could be proved by
circumstantial evidence, such as a course of dealing.70
Jenson involved the financial failure of a grain elevator operation,
Warren Grain & Seed Co. (Warren). 1 Warren's lender, Cargill, Inc.
(Cargill), had financed Warren's entire business for more than fourteen
years. As part of the financing agreement, Cargill was given a right of
first refusal to purchase Warren's grain, the right to inspect Warren's
books, the right to approve dividend declarations and other stock trans-
actions, and the right to approve capital improvements in excess of five
thousand dollars. 72 The agreement also prohibited Warren from guaran-
teeing debts or encumbering assets without Cargill's consent.73
In finding that Cargill's involvement constituted de facto control of
Warren's business, the court emphasized those terms of the financing
agreement listed above as well as the following factors: Cargill's con-
stant recommendations and criticism regarding Warren's finances, of-
ficers' salaries, and inventory; Cargill's right to enter Warren's premises
65. Liability also has been imposed on a lender for lack of control. Connor v. Great W. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). In Connor a construction
lender was found liable to home purchasers for construction defects. The court held that the
lender's financing activities imposed a duty on the lender to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
sale of defective homes. The lender was liable for failing to use its influence and control as the
construction lender to ensure that its borrower built nondefective homes. Id.
66. See infra note 75.
67. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
68. Id. at 290.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 288.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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and conduct periodic checks and audits; Cargill's name on all of War-
ren's financial correspondence; and Cargill's ability to terminate War-
ren's operating capital.7 4 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency,7 5
the Jenson court concluded that Cargill was liable as a principal for the
business deeds of its debtor, Warren. 6
Although related to the theory of agency, the instrumentality or
alter ego theory relies on different factual underpinnings. While both
theories entail control by the lender that goes beyond an ordinary
debtor-creditor relationship, the distinction between the two centers on
the amount of control and involvement required to impose a fiduciary
duty on the lender. Under the instrumentality or alter ego theory the
creditor must assume "actual, participatory, total control of the
debtor.77 A creditor must dominate a debtor's business so completely
that either the creditor becomes the debtor's alter ego, or the debtor
becomes the creditor's instrument. Under the agency theory, as shown
in Jenson, a slightly lesser degree of involvement is necessary to find an
agent-principal relationship. The following case illustrates the degree of
control needed to create liability under the instrumentality or alter ego
theory.
In Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemical
Corp.7'8 ten creditors of a reorganized corporation sought to hold an-
other creditor liable for the corporation's debts on the ground that the
debtor corporation was an instrumentality or alter ego of the defendant
creditor.7 9 In order to find a duty based on the theory of instrumental-
ity or alter ego, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals required a showing
that the lender was in "actual, participatory, [or] total control" of the
74. Id. at 291.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY]
(stating that a "creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the mutual benefit of
himself and his debtor, may become a principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the
debtor in connection with the business"). An accompanying comment to the Restatement further
provides:
A security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of his debtor by
preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not thereby become a principal.
However, if he takes over the management of the debtor's business either in person or
through an agent, and directs what contracts may or may not be made, he becomes a princi-
pal, liable as any principal for the obligations incurred thereafter in the normal course of
business by the debtor who has now become his general agent. The point at which the credi-
tor becomes a principal is that at which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his
debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with his debtor may be.
Id. § 14 0 comment a.
76. Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 290.
77. Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th
Cir. 1973); see infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
78. 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
79. Id. at 1101.
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management of the debtor's affairs."' Applying this standard of "total"
control, the court declined to charge the lender with responsibility for
the borrower's debts."' Although the lender was involved in the bor-
rower's financial management, liquidation of assets, and contractual ob-
ligations, the court found insufficient evidence to support a jury
decision that the debtor had "no separate mind, will or existence of its
own. "82 Thus, the Krivo court required a higher degree of involvement
than the court in Jenson, which found an agency relationship based on
a definition of agency requiring "consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control."88
The lender in Krivo might have been charged with liability under
the agency standard used in Jenson. Likewise, the lender in Jenson
may have escaped liability by failing to satisfy the total control test for
instrumentality used in Krivo. Although both cases involved lenders
which participated to some degree in their borrower's financial manage-
ment, the courts applied different standards to determine liability
based on control. Because of these differing standards, it is difficult for
lenders to determine when they are risking liability by exerting too
much control over their borrowers. Additionally, some courts have cho-
sen not to apply agency or instrumentality theories in a creditor-debtor
context and instead have based liability on various other factors which
these courts have deemed to indicate excessive control.
Ownership of the borrower's stock is one factor that may indicate
enough lender control to create a fiduciary duty. Although stock owner-
ship alone does not constitute domination of a borrower,8 inequitable
use of that ownership or ownership in addition to other controlling con-
duct may indicate excessive control. For example, in In re Process-
Manz Press, Inc. 5 Armstrong, the creditor, held more than ninety per-
cent of Process-Manz's stock as collateral for its loan. Armstrong used
this control to amend the articles of incorporation so that preferred
stock could be redeemed. Armstrong then redeemed approximately
280,000 shares of preferred stock, which eliminated two million dollars
of Process-Manz's working capital.8 7 Armstrong took this action al-
though Process-Manz already was experiencing difficulty in paying its
obligations.88 An Illinois district court upheld the referee in bank-
80. Id. at 1105.
81. Id. at 1109.
82. Id.
83. Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 290; see supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
84. Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1109.
85. 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966).
86. Id. at 338-39.
87. Id. at 339.
88. Id. at 348.
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ruptcy's order to subordinate the lender's claim against Process-Manz
to the claims of the unsecured creditors.8 9 The Process-Manz court
found that Armstrong was essentially an owner and, as such, owed a
fiduciary duty to Process-Manz's other creditors.9
In In re American Lumber Co.,9 another case involving stock own-
ership, the lender did not directly use its ownership interest to control
the borrower. The stock ownership was an additional factor indicating
excess control, but it is doubtful that the stock holdings alone would
have resulted in a fiduciary status.92 The American Lumber court em-
phasized control of operations in its finding of excessive lender con-
trol.93 A lender's control of its borrower's operations can lead to a
finding of liability under an agency or instrumentality theory; however,
a court need not use either of these theories directly.
In American Lumber the lender, a controlling creditor, foreclosed
on its security interest in equipment, inventory, and receivables, effec-
tively taking over the debtor's plant.9 The lender received all of the
debtor's mail, including payments on accounts receivable, and approved
all payments to other creditors. 5 The lender forced the debtor to termi-
nate all employees except a minimal crew kept on to assist with liquida-
tion. 6 The corporate officers' salaries were cut to one-sixth of their
prior levels."7 The Minnesota district court found that the lender had
abused its power as a controlling creditor, thereby injuring the other
creditors of the debtor. 8 Thus, the court subordinated the claims of the
lender to those of the other creditors. 9
As these cases illustrate, control liability need not be grounded in
an agency or instrumentality theory. Factors such as control of stock,
selection of management, involvement in daily operations or financial
management, and use of the borrower's business to achieve a purpose of
the lender all can show excessive control resulting in a fiduciary duty to
the borrower and other creditors.100 Additionally, borrowers can use
89. Id. at 349.
90. Id.
91. Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re American Lumber Co.), 5 Bankr. 470 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1980).
92. Id. at 478.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 473-74.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 474.
97. Id. at 478.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Miller, Calfo & Levy, The Fiduciary Duty of Lenders Through Excessive
Involvement or Control Over Borrowers in Lender Liability Cases, 434 P.L.I. COM. L. & PRAC. SEre
161 (1987).
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control factors to establish liability under a tort theory, such as inter-
ference with a business purpose. 1 1 Some commentators believe that
common-law tort theories, because they are less complex than control
theories,0 2 perhaps provide clearer guidelines for both lenders and bor-
rowers. The various standards represented by the agency, instrumental-
ity, and other control theories show the need for more definite
guidelines. Lenders which find it too difficult to weigh the risks in-
volved in assisting a troubled borrower may refuse to extend help at all.
This refusal not only deprives the borrower of a chance to recover, but
also decreases junior creditors' chances to receive a larger part of their
claims.103
2. Special Relationships
Even when a lender is not involved substantially in its borrower's
business, thus making control liability unlikely, other actions by the
lender still may expose it to liability based on the existence of a fiduci-
ary duty. This situation can arise when the lender is involved in a spe-
cial relationship of trust or confidentiality with its borrower. 0 4 If the
relationship is such that it is reasonable for the borrower to rely on the
lender to protect the borrower's interest, the lender has a fiduciary duty
to the borrower. 10 5 A lender that takes advantage of a borrower's reli-
ance that the lender will further the borrower's interest will be liable
for breach of its fiduciary duty to the borrower.
Two early cases involving the imposition of fiduciary duties on
lenders are Earl Park State Bank v. Lowmon'0 6 and Stewart v. Phoenix
101. See infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
102. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 795.
103. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text.
104. Black's Law Dictionary defines a fiduciary relation as follows:
A relation subsisting between two persons in regard to a business, contract, or piece of prop-
erty, or in regard to the general business or estate of one of them, of such a character that
each must repose trust and confidence in the other and must exercise a corresponding degree
of fairness and good faith. Out of such a relation, the law raises the rule that neither party
may exert influence or pressure upon the other, take selfish advantage of his trust, or deal
with the subject-matter of the trust in such a way as to benefit himself or prejudice the other
except in the exercise of the utmost good faith and with the full knowledge and consent of
that other, business shrewdness, hard bargaining, and astuteness to take advantage of the
forgetfulness or negligence of another being totally prohibited as between persons standing in
such a relation to each other. Examples of fiduciary relations are those existing between attor-
ney and client, guardian and ward, principal and agent, executor and heir, trustee and cestui
que trust, landlord and tenant, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK'S].
105. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 75, §§ 1, 13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§
2, 170 comment (a) (1959).
106. 92 Ind. App. 25, 161 N.E. 675 (1928).
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National Bank.10 7 In Earl Park a bank persuaded its customer to bor-
row from the bank and to loan the borrowed funds to another bank
customer who was in debt to the bank. The borrower was a farmer with
little business experience who relied greatly on the advice he received
from the bank's manager on business matters. The manager never told
the farmer that the other customer planned to use the borrowed funds
to pay off his debt to the bank. An Indiana court of appeals found that
the bank was liable to the farmer for breaching its fiduciary duty to
disclose.108
In Stewart circumstances similar to those in Earl Park led the Ari-
zona Supreme Court to find a fiduciary duty of disclosure.109 The bank
in Stewart acted as a farmer's financial advisor for twenty-three years
and routinely loaned him funds on an unsecured basis.110 In 1931 the
bank requested that the farmer give the bank a mortgage on real estate
that the farmer owned as security for an already existing loan.1 The
bank told the farmer that it was taking this mortgage merely as a for-
mality to satisfy record keeping requirements and that it would not
foreclose on the property. 12 Despite these representations, the bank
foreclosed."1 '
The Stewart court acknowledged that "ordinarily no confidential
relation arises" out of the relationship between a bank and its deposi-
tor; however, the relationship in the instant case was "far beyond that
of a mere debtor and creditor."" 4 The court discussed the nature of
modern commercial transactions and concluded that fiduciary stan-
dards were appropriate in certain banking relationships.115 Thus, the
107. 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937).
108. Earl Park, 92 Ind. App. at 38, 161 N.E. at 679.
109. Stewart, 49 Ariz. at 34, 64 P.2d at 101.
110. Id. at 40, 64 P.2d at 104.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 41, 64 P.2d at 104.
113. Id. at 41, 64 P.2d at 105.
114. Id. at 44, 64 P.2d at 106.
115. Id. at 45-46, 64 P.2d at 106. The court stated:
It may have been that generations ago, when most commercial transactions were for cash, or
at least consisted merely of personal obligations between vendor and purchaser, and the
highly complicated modern structure of credit and corporate securities did not exist, that
banks, which were originally merely places of security where a man might deposit his cash
and valuables, did not, as such, hold any greater confidential relations with their clients than
those between any other two businessmen. But times have changed. It is almost inconceivable
that any man should engage in financial transactions of any magnitude in the modern time
without having recourse to some bank not only as a place of safety to keep his money, but as
a place where he might secure loans to conduct his business. It is notorious that modern
banks, before they make a loan of any extent, make a rigid investigation of the business of
their customer, and even the purpose for which the loan is to be used, basing their action
thereon. It is equally notorious that in many, if not most, cases an investor will consult his
bank before committing himself, believing that he has the right to rely upon the advice of its
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court found that a confidential relationship existed and that the bank
had a duty to disclose its true intentions regarding the mortgage. " '
Many recent cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty also have
focused on the duty to disclose.11 7 Courts that find a fiduciary relation-
ship between a bank and its borrower generally base their holdings on
the existence of a special relationship. As in Stewart, something beyond
an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship is necessary. " 8
One of the most frequently cited cases concerning this issue is the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Klein v. First Edina National
Bank." ' In Klein a woman brought suit when her bank foreclosed on
stock she had pledged as security for a loan to her employer. The bank
failed to inform her that her employer already owed the bank 9250 dol-
lars on another loan and that the stock would be the only collateral for
both loans.1 20 Although the woman had been a customer of the bank for
twenty years during which time she had maintained several savings and
checking accounts, rented safety deposit boxes, and obtained a mort-
gage, the court found that the bank was not under a fiduciary duty of
disclosure. 21 The requisite special relationship was lacking because the
bank was not aware that the woman was relying on the bank to look
after her interests and to advise her.122
Several courts have adopted the Klein approach and held that a
officers as being given in good faith. It has even become a common, if not practically a univer-
sal, practice, for banks to advertise that they are desirous of performing many services always
held to be confidential in their nature, such as trustee, executor, administrator, and the like,
for all who care to do business with them. So much has this become the custom that in many
cases they have attempted to extend such services to the relation of attorney and client, and
it has required legislation in many states to prevent this. We are of the opinion that, in view
of all these modern business practices, of which we cannot be ignorant, that where it is alleged
a bank has acted as the financial advisor of one of its depositors for many years, and that the
latter has relied upon such advice, it is a sufficient allegation that a confidential relationship
in regard to financial matters does exist and that, if it is proved, the bank is subject to the
rules applying to confidential relations in general. This of course, does not mean that the
bank may not make a reasonable legitimate profit from the client, but it does mean that it
cannot appeal to the doctrine of caveat emptor, and that it must disclose fairly and honestly
to the client all the facts which might be presumed to influence him in regard to his actions.
Id.
116. Id. Although the court found that the bank had breached its confidential relationship
with the farmer, the farmer did not prevail on his claim; a prior determination against the farmer
served as res judicata to prevent him from winning his claim. Id. at 47-49, 64 P.2d at 107-08.
117. For a discussion of the related claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, see infra
text accompanying notes 152-60.
118. Stewart, 49 Ariz. at 44, 64 P.2d at 106.
119. 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972).
120. Id. at 420-21, 196 N.W.2d at 621-22.
121. Id. at 422, 196 N.W.2d at 623. The court stated that "[t]he fact that plaintiff had done
business with defendant for nearly 20 years could not by itself place defendant in a confidential
relation to plaintiff." Id.
122. Id.
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bank will not have a fiduciary duty to inform the customer unless the
bank knows, or should know, that the customer is relying reasonably on
the bank to protect the customer's interests. 123 Other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have found a confidential relationship on similar facts, although
the bank had not consciously assumed a fiduciary duty.124
In Barnett Bank v. Hooper,25 for example, the bank failed to dis-
close a suspected check kiting scheme to a borrower who borrowed
funds to invest with the suspected kiter. The borrower intended to in-
vest the borrowed funds in a tax shelter which he originally had in-
vested in a year before. When the original investment was made, the
bank had told the borrower that the investment was sound. To com-
plete the second investment, the borrower and the suspected kiter
called the bank and arranged for ninety thousand dollars of borrowed
funds to be deposited into the suspected kiter's account. About ten
days later, the check kiting was confirmed, but because the proceeds of
the loan had been deposited into the kiter's account, the bank was able
to close the account without a loss. The court found that the bank's
initial recommendation of the investment coupled with the borrower's
long relationship with the bank" 6 was enough to create a confidential
relationship between the institution and its customer.227 The dissent,
123. See, e.g., Kurth v. Van Horn, 380 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1986) (holding that although the
customer placed his trust and confidence in the bank, there was no evidence to show that the bank
was aware of the customer's reliance and, thus, no fiduciary duty); see also Denison State Bank v.
Madeira, 230 Kan. 684, 696, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243-44 (1982) (finding that the defendant was compe-
tent and able to protect his own interests and that he could not impose a fiduciary relationship
without unilaterally a conscious assumption of such duties by the bank); Stenberg v. Northwestern
Nat'l Bank, 307 Minn. 487, 488, 238 N.W.2d 218, 219 (1976) (determining that Mr. Stenberg was a
businessman, "capable of independent judgment," and concluding that there was no evidence to
support a finding of a special duty owed by the bank); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio
St. 2d 282, 287, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1979) (stating that advice given by the bank was insufficient
to create a fiduciary relationship because neither party had, or should have had, a reasonable ex-
pectation that the bank acted primarily for the benefit of the borrower).
124. See, e.g., Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986); infra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text; see also Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16,
20-21 (1986) (finding that a fiduciary duty based on the borrowers' trust and confidence in the loan
officer and on their reliance on the officer's advice on mergers); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985) (determining that the relation-
ship between a bank and its depositor is at least "quasi-fiduciary"); Deist v. Wachholz, 208 Mont.
207, 218-20, 678 P.2d 188, 194-95 (1984) (finding a fiduciary duty to disclose based on the bank's
role as the plaintiff's advisor).
125. 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
126. Id. at 924. The borrower had been doing business with the bank for more than eight
years. Id.
127. Id. at 924-25. The court stated:
[W]e find that where a bank becomes involved in a transaction with a customer with whom it
has established a relationship of trust and confidence, and it is a transaction from which the
bank is likely to benefit at the customer's expense, the bank may be found to have assumed a
duty to disclose facts material to the transaction, peculiarly within its knowledge, and not
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following the Klein position, argued that no fiduciary duty should have
been found absent a conscious acceptance of the duties of a fiduciary on
the part of the bank.12 8
Although a majority of cases that involve a fiduciary duty based on
a special relationship concern a lender's alleged duty to disclose, several
other issues can arise which require a fiduciary duty to be shown. For
example, in Atlantic National Bank v. Vest 129 a Florida appellate court
held that a fiduciary duty arose when a customer asked a bank loan
officer a legal question.'"0 The customer's inquiry placed the bank in a
position of superiority and influence and, thus, imposed a duty on the
bank to answer in good faith.13M The court, however, found that the
bank discharged its duty when one of its loan officers stated that she
did not know the answer to the question. 32
Other issues involving a fiduciary duty based on a special relation-
ship include a construction lender's duty to disclose potential flooding
to a purchaser,133 and a lender's duty to keep the contents of a loan
application confidential.3 As in cases involving a fiduciary duty im-
posed because of a lender's excessive control, however, the different
standards used to determine whether a fiduciary duty exists based on a
special relationship leave banks with few guidelines with which to de-
termine their risks in a given situation. In the jurisdictions that follow
Klein, banks will have a fiduciary duty to their customers in fewer situ-
ations than in those jurisdictions that do not require banks consciously
to assume such duties. Additionally, when the circumstances involve an
issue other than the duty to disclose, even fewer guidelines exist, and
often the case will be one of first impression.
Because of the complexity of the fiduciary theories and the scarcity
of definite guidelines, plaintiffs have begun to bring claims against lend-
ers under tort theories. Unlike the fiduciary actions, most of the tort
theories are well defined and have clearly established elements. The
next section examines the different tort theories that have been brought
otherwise available to the customer.
Id. at 925.
128. Id. at 927-29.
129. 480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
130. Id. at 1333. Although the plaintiff was a long-time customer of the bank, the court did
not expressly consider this fact in finding a fiduciary duty. Id. at 1330, 1333.
131. Id. at 1332-33.
132. Id. When the loan officer could not answer the question, she called the plaintiff's insur-
ance agent and relayed the agent's answer to the defendant. The information was not correct and
formed the basis of the plaintiff's complaint against the bank for misrepresentation. Id. at 1330.
133. Camp v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 12 Ark. App. 150, 671 S.W.2d 213 (1984).
134. Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982). This
duty could cause a direct conflict with the duty to disclose information about another customer
found in cases such as Barnett, discussed supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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against lenders in recent years.
B. Tortious Lender Liability
Tort law protects members of society from unreasonable actions of
others by setting certain minimum standards of conduct.'35 When con-
duct by a member of society does not meet these standards, tort law
punishes the offender to deter others from performing similar acts in
the future."' Thus, when a bank's conduct falls below the standards of
reasonable conduct and injures a borrower or other customer of the
bank, tort remedies are imposed to compensate the injured party and to
discourage other banks from conducting similar transactions in the
future.
State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co.' 37 is a leading
tort case in lender liability. Farah Manufacturing Company (FMC) be-
gan in 1919 as a family-owned apparel manufacturer. 8' William J.
Farah (Farah) was the chief executive officer of FMC from 1964 until
1976, when the Board of Directors demanded that he step down follow-
ing a strike, a nationwide boycott, and substantial losses.139 After his
replacement, FMC executed a secured loan agreement with three lend-
ers (the banks).140 The loan agreement included a clause prohibiting a
change in management "which any two Banks shall consider, for any
reason whatsoever, to be adverse to the interests of the Banks.''
When FMC continued to lose money, Farah requested that the
Board re-elect him as chief executive officer. 42 Fearful that Farah's
election would trigger a default in the loan agreement, the Board in-
structed Farah to present his plan to the banks. 43 The banks re-
sponded by advising the Board in a letter that Farah's election as chief
executive officer was unacceptable and that the banks would not waive
their rights under the management change clause if Farah was
elected. 44 Furthermore, representatives of the banks threatened to
"bankrupt the company and.., padlock it the next day" if Farah was
elected. 45 At the time the letter was sent and the threats made, how-
ever, the banks either had decided previously not to declare a default
135. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 92, at 613.
136. Diamond, supra note 20, at 427 n.7.
137. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
138. Id. at 667.
139. Id. at 670.
140. Id. at 667.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 670.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 672.
145. Id. at 673.
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under the loan agreement, or had not reached a decision on the
matter.146
As a result of the banks' warnings, Farah withdrew his election pro-
posal. Thereafter, the election resulted in a board comprised primarily
of individuals who were affiliated with or proposed by the banks. De-
spite efforts of the newly elected Board, FMC's financial condition con-
tinued to falter. 14 7 When FMC's position became desperate, Farah
initiated a successful proxy fight which led to the election of a board
that reinstated him as chief executive officer. 148 Within a short time,
FMC began to prosper under Farah's direction. 49
After Farah's return FMC filed suit against the banks for damages
incurred during his absence. At trial, the jury found that the lenders
had committed acts of fraud, duress, and interference, and awarded
more than eighteen million dollars in damages to FMC. 50 On appeal
the damage award was modified and affirmed.' 5 '
1. Fraud
While the specific elements of the tort of fraud are controlled by
state law, generally, a party must show that the speaker knowingly or
recklessly made a false, material representation on which the party re-
lied and, as a consequence, was injured. 152 Furthermore, a representa-
tion that is capable of two interpretations, one which is known to be
false and the other which is known to be true, also may comprise a
fraudulent misrepresentation. 5 3 FMC's claim of fraud, for example, fo-
cused on a letter which stated that the banks would not waive their
146. Id. at 686.
147. Id. at 676-79.
148. Id. at 679.
149. Id. at 679-80.
150. Id. at 667.
151. Id. at 699. The judgment was reduced from $18,947,348.77 to $18,647,243.77. Id.
152. See id. at 681 (citing Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138,
143 (Tex. 1974)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS]. The Restatement states:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the
purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to
liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation.
Id.
153. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 152, § 527. Section 527 of the Restatement states:
A representation that the maker knows to be capable of two interpretations, one of which he
knows to be false and the other true is fraudulent if it is made:
(a) with the intention that it be understood in the sense in which it is false, or
(b) without any belief or expectation as to how it will be understood, or
(c) with reckless indifference as to how it will be understood.
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rights under the management change clause if Farah was elected, as
well as on the banks' threats to bankrupt and padlock FMC. 54 The
letter and threats did not convey the banks' true intentions, however,
because the banks either had decided not to declare a default, or had
not reached a decision on the matter. The appellate court upheld the
jury's finding of fraud stating that the banks had made a promise which
they did not intend to perform. 155
Lenders also may be held liable under the related tort theory of
negligent misrepresentation. Generally, to succeed on a claim of negli-
gent misrepresentation, a party must show that the representor: (1) in-
tentionally made a material misrepresentation, or (2) failed to exercise
due care when he made the material misrepresentation, or (3) omitted a
fact on which the party relied and by which the party was injured.15
For example, in Crystal Springs Trout Co. v. First State Bank157 the
Montana Supreme Court held a lender liable for assuring the share-
holders of a partially destroyed trout farm that interim financing was
available. The Crystal Springs court found that the bank's failure to
provide the promised financing was a negligent misrepresentation that
proximately caused the failure of the corporation. 5 8 Likewise, in
154. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
155. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 682. For other cases involving fraud, see: General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 773 F.2d 771 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that fraud existed when a
lender made representations to a third party about one of the lender's customers that created a
false impression of the customer's financial soundness); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp.
1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that fraud existed when officers
and directors of the debtor company resigned their positions in reliance on the lenders' representa-
tions that they would make further loans and would not call the outstanding loans of the com-
pany); Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985)
(finding fraud when a lender made representations that future financing might be forthcoming
after an assignment of accounts receivable, when in fact the lender already had determined not to
extend further loans); Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (in which the plaintiff claimed that silence on the part of the lender was intended as a
representation that the plaintiff's note would be renewed, and the court dismissed the claim be-
cause the elements of reliance and proximate cause were lacking); and Citibank v. Plapinger, 66
N.Y.2d 90, 485 N.E.2d 974, 495 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1985) (foreclosing a claim of a lender's fraudulent
inducement to sign a guarantee because of the "absolute and unconditional" language in the
guarantee).
156. Berkline Corp. v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699, 702 (Miss. 1984). Negligent misrepre-
sentation is essentially a subset of the tort of fraud that imposes liability when the representor
makes the representation without exercising due diligence and reasonable care.
157. 732 P.2d 819 (Mont.), modified, 736 P.2d 95 (1987).
158. Id. at 824. For other cases involving a lender's negligent misrepresentation, see: Atlantic
Nat'l Bank v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that a loan officer's convey-
ance of incorrect information did not constitute negligent misrepresentation when the plaintiff
knew that the information was not the officer's opinion or the opinion of the bank); Danca v.
Taunton Sav. Bank, 385 Mass. 1, 429 N.E.2d 1129 (1982) (finding negligent misrepresentation
when bank officials negligently failed to disclose irregularities in a house plan purchased by the
mortgagors for the purpose of verifying that the location of the house they were to purchase com-
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Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn159 a lender was held liable for negli-
gent misrepresentation when it failed to exercise reasonable care in
promising to loan money on a corporation's purchase orders. 16 0
2. Duress
Duress occurs when one party wrongfully threatens another party,
depriving the threatened party of the exercise of its free will and caus-
ing it to do that which it otherwise would not do.'' Typically, duress,
or business compulsion, is raised as a defense to avoid contractual lia-
bility.'6 2 Some courts, however, permit plaintiffs to assert duress as an
affirmative tort. The borrower in Farah, for instance, affirmatively and
successfully argued duress.
FMC's claim for duress, like its fraud claim, focused on the letter
concerning the lenders' refusal to waive default and on their threats
concerning the bankruptcy and padlocking of FMC. Although the lend-
ers had a legal right to declare a default if Farah was elected,'"$ the
lenders' pre-election threats and warnings were designed to manipulate
the election unlawfully. The court found that the lenders' threats to
enforce legal rights were made in bad faith and, thus, constituted ac-
tionable duress. 164
Pecos Construction Co. v. Mortgage Investment Co.'6 5 provides an-
other example of an injured borrower asserting duress as an affirmative
plied with zoning laws); and Berkline Corp. v. Bank of Miss., 453 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1984) (finding
that the lender could incur liability under the theory of negligent misrepresentation if it had not
exercised reasonable care and diligence in dispensing information regarding the credit worthiness
of one of its customers).
159. 95 Misc. 2d 967, 409 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
160. Id. at 991-93, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67.
161. See 13 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1602 (3d ed. 1970). The
elements of common-law duress generally include:
(1) ... a threat to do some act which the party threatening has no legal right to do. (2) [The]
threat must be of such character as to destroy the free agency of the party to whom it is
directed. . . overcom[ing] his will and caus[ing] him to do that which he... was not legally
bound to do. (3) The restraint caused by such threat must be imminent. (4) It must be such
that the person to whom it is directed has no present means of protection.
Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 684 (quoting Dale v. Simon, 267 S.W. 467, 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)). Hard
bargaining or the existence of financial pressures alone will not constitute duress. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 606 F. Supp. 558, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
162. See, e.g., Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 204 Cal.
Rptr. 86 (1984); Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
163. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 686.
164. Id. at 684-86. The court found that the lenders acted in bad faith by threatening to
declare a default at a time when FMC was not in default and was fully able to make repayment.
The court focused on "whether the creditor's attempt to accelerate stemmed from a reasonable,
good-faith belief that its security was about to become impaired." Id. at 685 (citing Sheppard Fed.
Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1969)).
165. 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969).
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tort. In Pecos a lender agreed to furnish interim financing for the con-
struction of a housing project.16 6 After Pecos had expended substantial
sums on the project, however, the lender refused to furnish the financ-
ing unless Pecos agreed to pay a twelve thousand dollar debt the lender
owed to an unrelated third party.16 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court
found that Pecos's agreement to pay the debt was extracted wrongfully
and constituted duress.6 8
Most jurisdictions recognize the tort of intentionally causing emo-
tional distress, which is superficially related to duress. This cause of
action exists when "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct in-
tentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another." '69
In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America 70 the California Supreme Court
held a lender liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress when
the bank first had decided not to make additional loans to the borrow-
ers and then publicly ridiculed the borrowers by using profanities,
pointing at them and laughing about their financial plight. 71
3. Interference with Advantageous Relations
Historically, a claim for tortious interference arose when a third
party intentionally and improperly interfered with the performance of a
contract by causing one of the parties to the contract not to perform. 17 2
The Farah court expanded the interference theory beyond interference
with an existing or prospective contract to include the governance pro-
cess of corporations and their shareholders. FMC based its claim of in-
terference on the lenders' actions rejecting Farah as a candidate for
chief executive officer, forcing Farah's resignation as chief executive of-
166. Id. at 681, 459 P.2d at 843.
167. Id. at 682, 459 P.2d at 844.
168. Id.
169. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 152, § 46.
170. 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985).
171. 38 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 701 P.2d at 837-38, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 691. But see Kruse v. Bank of
Am., 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 66-68, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217, 234-35 (1988) (holding that a bank official's
statements to others concerning a real estate broker's "guts" in selling her mother's house did not
rise to the level of outrageous conduct necessary for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631, 635 (Mont. 1987) (holding that absent a showing of
physical or mental injury, mental distress is compensable only if the conduct substantially invades
a legally protected interest and causes a significant impact on the plaintiff).
172. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 152, § 766. The Restatement notes:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract. . . be-
tween another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to
perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the
other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
Id.; see also 45 AM. JuR. 2D Interference § 1 (1969) (stating that "the theory of the tort of interfer-
ence is that the law draws a line beyond which no member of the community may go in intention-
ally intermeddling with the business affairs of others").
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ficer, packing the Board with representatives of the lenders, and sup-
porting the proxy fight against Farah. The court found that FMC had a
right to have its affairs managed by competent, loyal directors and of-
ficers chosen through the corporate election process and that the lend-
ers had interfered impermissibly with this right.'73
Melamed v. Lake County National Bank'7" shows the importance
of a borrower's right to manage his own business. In Melamed the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence of tortious interfer-
ence to submit the claim to the jury when a lender instituted a plan
that required the borrower to reduce the salary of its president by fifty
percent, to replace its accountant with one chosen by the lender, and to
approve all payments through the lender. 175 Additionally, the lender
prepared a "[Thirteen]-Point Program" to help salvage everything pos-
sible from the borrower.' 76 The court rejected the lender's defense that
such actions were typical and necessary in workout situations.1'
On the other hand, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Del State
Bank v. Salmon'T8 held that a party may have a privilege to interfere
with another's contract or business affairs when it does so to better its
own business and without intent to harm another. 7 9 In Del State a
lender's actions caused the termination of the president of a debtor cor-
poration. 180 The court found that the lender's actions were privileged
because the actions were based on its desire to better its financial posi-
tion as a creditor.'8 '
173. Farah, 678 S.W.2d at 690.
174. 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984). For other cases involving lender interference, see: In re
Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228, 242-43 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (cause of action for inter-
ference denied because bank did not intentionally cause a breach of the plaintiff's contract, nor did
the bank intend to cause the termination of the plaintiff's business relationship); Iron Mountain
Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp. 1158, 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (defend-
ant's counterclaim of wrongful publication of its indebtedness to the plaintiff was insufficient to
state a claim for interference); and Kruse, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 65-66, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (lender's
failure to provide long term financing did not constitute interference because the interference must
be by a third party, not by a party to the economic relationship with which interference is
claimed).
175. Melamed, 727 F.2d at 1403-04.
176. Id. at 1404.
177. Id. at 1403-04. Note the similarity of the facts in this case with those cases described
under the section on fiduciary duty based on control. See supra notes 64-103 and accompanying
text.
178. 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1976).
179. Id. at 1027.
180. Id. at 1025.
181. Id. at 1027.
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4. Negligence
A valid claim for negligence arises from injury proximately caused
by the failure of one owing a duty to another to exercise the care that a
reasonable person would exercise under similar circumstances."8 2 In
First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Caudle' a lender was
held liable for failing to process a loan application with due care, which
resulted in the lender negligently telling the plaintiffs that they had
been approved for an FHA loan when in fact that was not the case.""
The plaintiffs did not learn of their failure to secure FHA financing
until after they completed the construction of their home and thus were
forced to obtain another loan at a higher interest rate.8 5 The Alabama
Supreme Court held that the bank had no duty to help the plaintiffs
procure an FHA loan, but that once the bank undertook to assist the
plaintiffs, it was required to act with due care."'
5. Prima Facie Tort
Under the prima facie tort theory, it is unlawful for someone inten-
tionally to injure another by performing an otherwise lawful act if the
act is done without justification.' While plaintiffs recently have not
met with much success asserting this theory against banks, it is evident
that the theory is becoming more prevalent. 88 For example, in Centerre
Bank v. Distributors, Inc. s9 a Missouri appellate court held a lender
liable under the prima facie tort theory for wrongfully calling a secured
demand note in the amount of nine hundred thousand dollars. The
lender had notified the debtor that the debt would be called after a
period of sixty days.190 The lender, however, continued to advance
182. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 110.
183. 425 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1982).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1051.
186. Id. at 1052; see also Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986)
(holding that a bank owes its customer a duty of reasonable care in processing a loan application).
187. See Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 543 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (citing State v. Kansas City Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 115 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984));
see also Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of
Malice, 63 B.U.L. REv. 1101 (1981); Note, Prima Facie Tort Recognized in Missouri, 47 Mo. L.
REV. 553, 555-60 (1983); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in Missouri: Commission of a Law-
ful Act with Intent to Injure May Result in Liability, 50 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 128, 129-38 (1981);
Annotation, PRIMA FAct TORT, 16 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1201-31 (1967 & Supp. 1988). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 152, § 870 & comments.
188. Some believe that the prima facie tort theory is indistinguishable in application from
the actionable implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which sounds in contract. Ebke & Grif-
fin, supra note 1, at 799. For a discussion of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, see
infra notes 199-237 and accompanying text.
189. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
190. Id. at 45.
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funds and to cooperate with the debtor well after the sixty day period
had elapsed. " 1 Suddenly, the lender made a formal demand for the
note and two weeks later took possession of the debtor's assets and ac-
counts receivable. 192 The jury found that the lender's actions were in-
tended to injure the debtor and returned a verdict of over 7.5 million
dollars, consisting of approximately 1.5 million dollars in actual dam-
ages and 6 million dollars in punitive damages.193 The appellate court
reversed the trial court on the grounds that the lender had a valid busi-
ness reason to justify its actions, 9 ' but acknowledged that a claim for
prima facie tort was a valid cause of action. 95
Another Missouri appellate court also failed to find the requisite
elements for prima facie tort in Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State
Bank."' The Shaughnessy court found that the defendant-bank lacked
the necessary intent to cause injury.1 97 The court noted that the
lender's awareness that injury might be the natural and probable conse-
quence of its actions did not constitute the type of intent required
under prima facie tort. " 8
Unlike the traditional tort theories applied in Farah, the prima fa-
cie tort lacks predictability. Banks will find it difficult to evaluate their
risks until precedential guidelines are established. Until such guidelines
are available, banks may retreat from their roles as monitors and senior
creditors, thus leaving failing debtors and junior creditors to fend for
themselves.
C. Duty of Good Faith-Tort or Contract?
Breach of the duty of good faith is becoming one of the claims most
frequently asserted against lenders. Courts differ, however, on the type
of damages that can be recovered. Some courts have allowed only con-
tractual remedies, citing the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement), or common law.1 9
191. Id. at 46.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 44. The trial court reduced the jury award to three million dollars. Id.
194. Id. at 55.
195. Id.
196. 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
197. Id. at 949.
198. Id.; see also Rigby, 713 S.W.2d 517 (upholding a summary judgment against a claim for
prima facie tort when a defendant-bank was justified in calling the plaintiff's note).
199. See, e.g., Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp.
1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Carrico v. Delp, 141 Ill. App. 3d 684, 490 N.E.2d 972 (1986); Rigby, 713
S.W.2d 517; Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988). For a detailed discussion of
the breach of the duty of good faith, see generally Special Project Note, "Bad Faith Breach",
infra.
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Other courts also have allowed recovery in tort.20 ° Even among the ju-
risdictions agreeing on the type of remedies allowed for a breach of the
duty of good faith, there is disagreement on when the duty of good
faith can be imposed.20'
Amidst this lack of judicial uniformity, the U.C.C. defines good
faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned," 20 2
and U.C.C. section 1-203 states that "[e]very contract or duty within
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or en-
forcement."2 " The Restatement includes virtually the same edict.20 4
Thus, the duty of good faith requires cooperation so that all parties in a
transaction will achieve their respective, reasonable expectations. 20 5 The
following cases illustrate the substantial liability lenders can face for
breaching the duty of good faith.
1. Line of Credit Cases
Some of the more far reaching lender liability cases have been
based on a lending procedure that establishes a line of credit. A line of
credit is essentially a pre-approval procedure effected for the conve-
nience of both lender and borrower. A borrower with a line of credit is
approved to borrow up to a predetermined limit without going through
a complete loan application process each time.206 Traditionally, a lender
has not been obligated to fund the borrower up to the predetermined
limit unless the line of credit agreement specifically provided for full
funding.20 7 Thus, under the traditional theory, a lender could terminate
the agreement at will.
In K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co. 20 1 the Sixth Circuit confronted
200. See, e.g., Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631 (Mont. 1987); First Nat'l Bank v.
Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984).
201. See infra notes 206-37 and accompanying text.
202. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1987). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts elaborates further
by giving examples of actions which violate good faith: "[E]vasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack
of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to spec-
ify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance." RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 63, § 205 comment d.
203. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1987).
204. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 63, § 205 (stating that "[e]very contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement").
205. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 30 U. CHL L. REV. 666, 669 (1963).
206. See BLACK'S, supra note 104, at 837.
207. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth Gen. Ltd., 386 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding "[a line of credit] does not impart upon the bank the legal responsibility to
loan up to the limit").
208. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Special Project Note, "Bad Faith Breach", infra,
at notes 99-108 and accompanying text; Special Project Note, Written Agreements, infra, at note
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this traditional rule when a jury awarded the borrower 7.5 million dol-
lars in damages as a result of the lender's bad faith refusal to continue
to fund the borrower under a line of credit. The borrower's line of
credit agreement required deposit of all of its accounts receivable into a
"blocked account" to be credited against the outstanding loan bal-
ance.20 9 This arrangement left K.M.C. totally dependent on the lender
for operating capital.210 Three years into the lending arrangement, the
lender suddenly refused a routine advance to K.M.C., although the loan
balance would not have exceeded the 3.5 million dollar lending limit.21" '
With no other funds available, K.M.C. soon collapsed.2"2
The K.M.C. Co. court, relying on the U.C.C., s13 held that the duty
of good faith required the lender to notify the borrower of its refusal to
lend in order to allow the borrower an opportunity to obtain alternate
financing or a buyer.1 4 The lender could have avoided liability if it had
shown a valid business reason for its actions.215 At the time of the re-
fusal, however, the lender was fully secured and would have suffered no
loss in the event of liquidation.216 Additionally, the jury made no find-
ing that a notice period would have decreased K.M.C.'s ability to pay
back the loan.21 7
Despite the apparent expansion of liability under K.M.C. Co., sev-
eral courts addressing the duty of good faith issue have chosen to dis-
tinguish K.M.C. Co. from the line of credit claims brought before them.
For example, in Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank21 8 a lender
refused to advance funds under a line of credit although the borrower
previously had notified the lender of his continued need for the
funds.2 19 The Missouri appellate court distinguished the situation from
K.M.C. Co., finding that Shaughnessy could have obtained alternate
funding more easily than the borrower in K.M.C. Co. 22 0 Because the
104 and accompanying text.
209. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 759.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 754, 762-63. Evidence at trial suggested that the refusal may have been motivated,
at least in part, by a personality conflict between the loan officer and the borrower. Id. at 761.
212. Id. at 754.
213. The court cited comment 8 to U.C.C. § 2-309, which states that "'the application of
principles of good faith and sound commercial practice normally call for such notification of the
termination of a going contract relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to seek a
substitute arrangement.'" Id. at 759 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-309 official comment 8 (1987)).
214. Id. at 763.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 762.
217. Id.
218. 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
219. Id. at 946.
220. Id. at 953.
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lender did not have as much control over Shaughnessy's capital as the
lender in K.M.C. Co., the Shaughnessy court did not find that the
lender's failure to give notice of termination constituted bad faith.221
Two recent cases, however, arguably show support for K.M.C. Co.,
although in one case the court did not reach a decision on the issue of a
duty of good faith, and in the other extraneous factors were involved.
An Illinois appellate court acknowledged in Carrico v. Delp="" that
there is a requirement of good faith when a lender terminates a line of
credit agreement, but did not reach this issue. In Reid v. Key Bank223
the jury found that the lender had terminated the borrower's credit in
bad faith. The finding, however, was based partially on grounds of im-
proper racial motivation.224 Thus, K.M.C. Co. did not receive strong ju-
dicial support from either decision.
2. Demand Note Cases
The demand note cases have developed around the official com-
ment to U.C.C. section 1-208. Section 1-208 requires a party to exercise
good faith when making a decision to accelerate payment or to require
additional collateral.225 The official comment to section 1-208 specifi-
cally excepts demand obligations "whose very nature permits call at any
time with or without reason. '226 Because the "without reason" language
arguably could justify a bad faith demand, several courts have refused
to require good faith when a demand note is involved.
In Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.2 27 a borrower unsuccessfully
claimed bad faith when the lender exercised its option to call a demand
note. Centerre involved a borrower who recently purchased a highly
leveraged business 21' and financed the transaction by a demand note
from the bank. When the borrower asked about continued financing by
the bank, a loan officer informed him that there would be no diffi-
culty.2 Despite these representations, the bank notified the borrower
of its intention to call the note three days after the borrower's purchase
221. Id. The court in Flagship National Bank v. Gray Distribution Systems, 485 So. 2d 1336
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), also distinguished the K.M.C. Co. decision. In Flagship the borrower
had exceeded his credit limit, had a shorter course of dealing with the lender, and arguably had
been given some form of notice. Flagship, 485 So.2d at 1341.
222. 141 Ill. App. 3d 684, 490 N.E.2d 972 (1986).
223. 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
224. Id. at 11-12.
225. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1987); see Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979).
226. U.C.C. § 1-208 official comment (1987).
227. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
228. Id. at 45.
229. Id.
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of the business.2 30 A Missouri court of appeals dismissed the borrower's
claim of bad faith stating that a requirement of good faith would add
an additional term to which the parties did not agree. 23 1 Similarly, a
Florida appellate court, in Flagship National Bank v. Gray Distribu-
tion Systems, 3 2 was faced with a claim of bad faith in calling a demand
note and held that an obligation of good faith could not be imposed to
override the express terms in the contract allowing the note to be called
on demand. 3
Some courts, however, have chosen to require good faith despite
the presence of demand language in a note. The line of credit extended
to the borrower in K.M.C. Co. was subject to payment on demand. 3 4
The K.M.C. Co. court, apparently oblivious to section 1-208's comment,
stated that "[tihe demand provision is a kind of acceleration clause,
upon which the Uniform Commercial Code and the courts have im-
posed limitations of reasonableness and fairness."2'3 Other courts simi-
larly have chosen to ignore demand language in a note, 36 or have found
that a note improperly was characterized as a demand note.237
3. Tortious Breach of Good Faith
The possibility of tortious liability is even more alarming to lenders
than contractual liability for breach of the duty of good faith. This
cause of action has become prevalent in insurance cases in which tort
remedies are provided for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.2 38 An attempt to extend these insurance principles to
other commercial settings was made in Seaman's Direct Buying Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. 239 Before Seaman's, tort remedies gener-
ally were not available for the breach of a commercial contract.
The California Supreme Court recognized in Seaman's that rela-
tionships outside the insurance area could give rise to a tortious cause
of action, but refused to extend tort remedies to all commercial con-
230. Id.
231. Id. at 48.
232. 485 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
233. Id.
234. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 760.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
237. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
238. See, e.g., Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d 141, 169 Cal. Rptr.
691 (1979); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 452 N.E.2d 1315 (1983); Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
239. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). For a further discussion of
Seaman's, see Special Project Note, "Bad Faith Breach", infra, at notes 71-85 and accompanying
text.
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tracts. 140 Instead, the Seaman's court created a limited cause of action
for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith when a de-
fendant denies in bad faith that a contract exists, or when a defendant
adopts a "stonewall" position." 1 Although claims of bad faith denial
and stonewalling have not yet become prevalent against lenders, Sea-
man's may have opened the door.
To date, only one reported case imposes tort liability on a lender
for bad faith.24 2 In First National Bank v. Twombly24 the borrower
signed a promissory note that required a lump sum payment in the
middle of August.244 When the borrower began to have financial diffi-
culties prior to August, he arranged with his loan officer to have the
note converted into an installment note.245 The loan officer was sched-
uled to be out of town on the date set to convert the loan, but he as-
sured the borrower that he had arranged for the lender's vice president
to handle the conversion.2 46 The vice president, however, claimed to
know nothing about the conversion and, instead, insisted that the bor-
rower pay the full amount of the promissory note immediately.2 7 Al-
though the note was not due for another two weeks, the vice president
decided to offset the loan balance against the borrower's checking ac-
count.2 48 The Montana Supreme Court in Twombly held that the duty
to exercise good faith could be "imposed by law," as well as by the con-
tract itself. 249 Although the court acknowledged that only contractual
damages could be recovered for a breach of the duty of good faith under
the U.C.C., it stated that punitive damages could be awarded for a
breach of the duty of good faith imposed by law. 50 The court held that
the lender had breached the duty imposed by law by acting in reckless
disregard of the borrower's rights, and that such actions supported a
240. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
241. Id. "Stonewalling" occurs when the defendant adopts a "see you in court" attitude with-
out cause and with no belief that he has a reasonable defense. Id. at 769-70, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206
Cal. Rptr. at 363.
242. First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984). A Montana case,
Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631 (Mont. 1987), acknowledged that tortious breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing may exist in a lending situation. The court in Rodgers v.
Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988), also conceded that tortious breach of contract might
lie in certain circumstances. Id. at 1227.
243. 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984). For a further discussion of Twombly, see Special
Project Note, "Bad Faith Breach," infra, at notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
244. Twombly, 213 Mont. at 68, 689 P.2d at 1228.
245. Id. at 69, 689 P.2d at 1228.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 70, 689 P.2d at 1229.
249. Id. at 73, 689 P.2d at 1230.
250. Id.
[Vol. 42:855
1989] LENDER LIABILITY
jury award of punitive damages.25'
No other court has imposed tortious liability on a lender for breach
of the duty of good faith, but several courts have expressed a willing-
ness to do so in appropriate circumstances. The Montana Supreme
Court, in Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 52 acknowledged that tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be found
when a defendant acted in a manner that was "arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable, and exceeded plaintiffs' justifiable expectation. '"25 3 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to impose tortious liability on a
lender for breaching a loan agreement in Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank,54
but recognized that "[g]ross recklessness or wanton negligence on be-
half of a party to a contract may call for an application of the theory of
tortious breach of contract." 55 Thus, although courts are hesitant to
impose tortious liability on a lender in a commercial setting, tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a valid cause of
action in several jurisdictions. 256
IV. EFFECTS OF LENDER LIABILITY
The previously discussed cases demonstrate the lack of guidelines
available for most of the lender liability theories being applied today.
Because lender liability is still a relatively new phenomenon, cases with
similar facts often will result in drastically different holdings.2 57 In some
instances courts view lenders as occupying a special position of respon-
sibility and power in society, while in others lenders are seen as merely
business entities to be treated like any other business entity. In reality,
it is the circumstances of each different situation that are determinative
of a lender's role in any given transaction.2 5 The theories of liability
251. Id.
252. 740 P.2d 631 (Mont. 1987).
253. Id. at 635 (citing McGregor v. Mommer, 714 P.2d 536, 546 (Mont. 1986)). The court
made this statement in the context of evaluating jury instructions. The jury had been given an
instruction for breach of good faith under the U.C.C. The court held that finding a breach under
this instruction was not enough to constitute a tort, then went on to give the requirements for
tortious breach of the covenant of good faith. Id. at 634-35.
254. 756 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1988).
255. Id. at 1227.
256. Some courts, however, have held that tortious liability is not appropriate in commercial
settings. See, e.g., Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods, 457 F. Supp.
1158, 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that Pennsylvania law would not allow tort recovery for breach
of the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing in an ordinary commercial setting);
Carrico v. Delp, 141 Ill. App. 3d 684, 690, 490 N.E.2d 972, 977 (1986) (stating that "[wihile the law
does not condone breach of contract, it does not consider it wrongful or tortious").
257. Compare A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981) with
Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
258. See supra notes 64-134 and accompanying text.
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discussed above have not been applied enough in a lender context to
provide parameters that would form a basis for more consistent
holdings.
One result of the uncertainty in the area of lender liability is higher
transaction costs to borrowers and other bank customers. Because it is
now much more difficult for banks to evaluate their risks when entering
into a relationship with a customer or borrower, the costs of evaluation
have increased.2 59 Banks then pass these increased costs on to borrow-
ers and customers in the form of higher loan processing fees and ele-
vated service charges. In some instances26 ° banks are unable to pass on
the increased costs and must absorb the expenses internally.261
Another result of the uncertainty caused by inconsistent decisions
is the deterrent effect on banks that engage in monitoring troubled
debtors. As senior creditors, banks monitor debtors in order to classify
the repayment potential of outstanding obligations. In the process of
protecting their own interests, banks often provide sophisticated finan-
cial advice that the debtor otherwise would be unable to obtain.26 2 Ad-
ditionally, by monitoring a highly leveraged debtor, the senior creditor
relieves more junior creditors from their monitoring duties, 6 ' and thus
reduces the other creditors' costs by allowing them to "free-ride" on the
senior creditor's monitoring activities.264 Thus, monitoring benefits the
debtor and junior creditors and, at the same time, provides protection
for the monitor.
Lender liability problems begin to arise when a lender acting as the
senior creditor steps in to try to salvage a failing debtor.265 If the lender
is successful, the debtor is saved and no one complains. If the lender is
unsuccessful, however, junior creditors and the debtor frequently have
viewed the lender as a deep pocket against whom to recover losses.
Monitoring lenders attempting to save a troubled debtor increasingly
259. Lending transactions encompass a variety of risks that cannot all be anticipated. The
possibility of lender liability increases the difficulty of assessing credit risks. This results in a more
lengthy and costly evaluation process. Increased certainty in the area of lender liability would
enable lenders to evaluate their risks more efficiently.
260. For example, when a post-disbursement event causes an already existing loan to be
reevaluated, the bank has no way to pass the costs of evaluation on to the borrower.
261. In these times of frequent bank failures, additional expenses such as these can be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for a bank to absorb successfully.
262. See Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 931
(1986).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 931-32; see also Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 53-54 (1982).
265. Often, the senior creditor is encouraged to become involved to give financial advice to
the debtor and to monitor the situation, which provides protection for all of the creditors. Scott,
supra note 262, at 919-22.
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have been found liable under one of the control theories. 66 As a result,
lenders are discouraged from aiding troubled borrowers and from pro-
viding beneficial monitoring services. In order to decrease the risks of
liability in monitoring and avoid this chilling effect, courts must distin-
guish clearly between a lender legitimately protecting its interests and a
lender overreaching its authority as a monitor. Clear guidelines are
needed in this area to encourage lenders to continue their activities as
monitors.
V. JUDICIARY'S RESPONSE
The early decisions in the area of lender liability can best be
viewed as a series of emergency measures, 67 not as a comprehensive
and consistent body of law. Most of the decisions were made in relative
isolation as cases of first impression. Thus, the liability theories existing
today are not the result of a carefully planned master program . 6s Sev-
eral recent reversals, however, show that appellate courts are beginning
to require clearly proven elements before a lower court's decision
against the lender will be upheld.269 Some courts also have begun to
recognize that borrowers owe lenders some of the same duties of open-
ness and fair dealing that have been required of lenders.270
A prominent example of a reversal based on a plaintiff's failure to
prove his cause of action clearly is Kruse v. Bank of America.27 1 A Cali-
fornia appellate court reversed an award of twenty-six million dollars27 2
in what was deemed to be one of California's first big "farm cases. '273
After a detailed review of the facts, the Kruse court held that the jury
verdicts for fraud, bad faith denial of contract, emotional distress, and
intentional interference with prospective business advantage were le-
gally insupportable.Y The court essentially separated each claim into
its respective required elements and, for each claim, found that one or
more of the elements could not be met by the facts of the case. 5
Kruse's articulate evaluation goes a long way in educating lenders about
266. See supra notes 64-103 and accompanying text.
267. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, dt 813.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 855 F.2d 963 (2d
Cir. 1988); Kruse v. Bank of Am., 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988).
270. See, e.g., FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (discussed in 1
LENDER LiABmrry LAW, supra note 16, No. 12, at 1; Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Butler, 626 F.
Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
271. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988). For a further discussion of Kruse, see
Special Project note, "Bad Faith Breach", infra, at notes 160-82 and accompanying text.
272. Id. at 44, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
273. Butler, Is Lender Liability Now Absolute Liability?, 15 W. ST. U.L. REV. 595, 609 (1988).
274. Kruse, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 53, 62, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 225, 232.
275. Id. at 54-58, 60-61, 65, 67, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 226-28, 230, 233-34, 235.
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exactly what will and will not expose them to liability, thereby allowing
lenders to evaluate their risks more easily. This type of analysis is ac-
complished more readily when traditional tort claims are involved be-
cause tort elements tend to be well-established.7 6 As the next case
shows, the same would hold true for contractual claims.
Penthouse International v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan,
with an award of one hundred twenty-nine million dollars compensa-
tory damages, involved one of the ten highest judgments entered in
1987.278 On appeal,2 9 a New York appellate court suppored its reversal
for claims of anticipatory breach and fraud with a detailed analysis of
the facts. The court discussed each of the four factual bases for the
claim of anticipatory breach and determined that they were not suffi-
cient to support the district court's finding that the lender had commit-
ted an anticipatory breach.280 The court also found that the plaintiff
had not established its readiness and ability to perform-a prerequisite
to a plaintiff's right to damages in an action for anticipatory breach. 8'
In reviewing the district court's finding of fraud, the Second Circuit
found that not all of the elements of fraud had been proven.282 As in
Kruse, lenders were again given a clear explanation for each of the
Penthouse court's findings.
These cases may signify the beginning of the development of relia-
ble guidelines in the area of lender liability. Both the Kruse and Pent-
house reversals indicate that courts have begun to scrutinize claims of
lender liability to ensure that each element of the claim has been
proven clearly. In another step toward the development of a consistent
body of law in the lender area, courts also have begun to hold borrowers
to the same duties of fairness that they have imposed on lenders.
In Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v. But-
ler283 a borrower was held liable for breaching its duty to bargain in
good faith. The borrower in that case had signed a commitment letter
obligating it to borrow twenty million dollars. 84 Shortly after the letter
was signed, however, interest rates began a decline that continued up
until the closing date of the loan.285 The borrower took advantage of the
delay between the signing of the commitment letter and the closing by
276. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 795.
277. 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
278. 2 LENDER LIABILrry REPORT, supra note 16, at 2 (citing Inside Litigation).
279. Penthouse, 855 F.2d 963.
280. Id. at 977.
281. Id. at 979.
282. Id. at 986.
283. 626 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
284. Id. at 1232.
285. Id.
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seeking a more favorable loan package from other lenders.286 The bor-
rower then attempted to frustrate attempts to close the loan by refusing
to negotiate.8 7 The Butler court held that the borrower breached its
implied duty to negotiate in good faith and awarded the lender approxi-
mately three million dollars.288
In another case ranking among the top ten highest judgments of
1987, a lender received one hundred million dollars in damages.2 "9 The
jury in FDIC v. W.R. Grace Co.2 90 found that the borrower failed to
disclose material facts to the lender regarding the borrower's ability to
repay its obligation. 1 Although the lender's claim in FDIC was not
brought in response to a claim of lender liability by the borrower, it
would not be surprising to see lenders using similar claims against
plaintiff-borrowers in future lender liability suits. 292 This type of
lender-borrower equality may curb the current flood of lender liability
litigation. The introduction of "borrower liability" adds consistency and
balance to the development of an effective body of lending law.
VI. CONCLUSION
As in any new area of legal development, the formulation of stan-
dards and guidelines in the area of lender liability will take time. The
recent reversals and "borrower liability" cases demonstrate the judici-
ary's willingness to inject clarity and equality into the hastily developed
law that resulted from the early lender liability cases. Improvement will
be slow, 293 and, meanwhile, the impact that the increasing number of
claims against lenders has on the credit market as a whole is significant.
Escalating commercial transaction costs may have at their root lenders'
fears of large, unanticipated liability. Monitoring by lenders, which pro-
vides important benefits to society as a whole, also may decrease as a
result of lenders' inabilities to gauge the risks involved. Although lender
liability may be needed in some circumstances to prevent lender over-
reaching, it is the borrower who will pay in the long run2 94 as lenders
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1235.
288. Id. at 1236.
289. F.D.I.C. v. W.R. Grace Co., 691 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In a jury award, the lender
received $25 million in compensatory and $75 million in punitive damages. 2 LENDER LIABILITY
LAW, supra note 16, No. 2, at 3.
290. 691 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
291. 1 LENDER LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 16, June 1988, at 1.
292. Id. at 4.
293. Arbitration may be a viable alternative which could help lenders avoid the expense and
delay of a judicial proceeding. See generally Special Project Note, Arbitration, infra.
294. The increased cost of evaluating lending risks and implementing safeguards will un-
doubtedly be passed on to the borrower as higher transactions costs.
1989]
890 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:855
take actions to protect themselves from claims that are often difficult, if
not impossible, to anticipate.
Frances E. Freund
